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With worldwide concern for how and where to dispose of household waste, policy-makers are in-
creasingly looking for tools to e¢ ciently and e⁄ectively reduce the amount of waste households produce.
Using a comprehensive household-level data set involving 10,251 respondents from a cross-section of ten
countries (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden), we examine waste policy, recycling behavior, and waste prevention. Unlike previous work,
we empirically make comparisons across countries, incorporate attitudinal characteristics, and allow for
potential correlation between the decisions of recycling di⁄erent materials.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, the issue of how a society should deal with municipal solid waste has become an important
policy problem. Despite an increasing awareness of the external e⁄ects of waste generation and a growing
resistance by society to the development of new land￿lls and incineration facilities, municipal solid waste
has grown drastically over the last decades as a result of higher incomes, more intensive use of packaging
materials and disposable goods, and increased purchases of durable material goods.1 Projections suggest
solid waste will continue to grow despite current e⁄orts to reduce the material content of products and to
stimulate the reuse of products and packaging and the recycling of materials and substances.
In response to the increasing environmental pressures of municipal waste, many countries have begun
to explore ways of reducing and disposing of it more e⁄ectively. In targeting one of the main sources of
municipal waste, household or residential waste,2 municipal governments (which tend to be responsible for
carrying out waste management and recycling services and for developing waste management programs
and can thus have much in￿ uence on waste reduction through policies and legislative measures) have grown
particularly interested in experimenting with unit pricing systems and improving recycling services. In the
US, for example, the number of jurisdictions with some sort of pay-as-you-throw or unit pricing program
increased from about 1,000 in 1993 to almost 7,100 in 2006 or about 25 percent of all US communities [31];
in Canada, the share of households with access to at least one type of recycling program increased from
about 70 percent in 1994 to 93 percent in 2006 [32].
To assist policy makers in the design of e¢ cient policies that e⁄ectively induce households to minimize
waste through recycling and/or waste prevention, a better understanding of household behavior is however
necessary. To this end, a new activity on ￿Household Behavior and Environmental Policy￿was initiated in
2005 by the OECD which covered not only waste generation and recycling but four other areas of house-
hold consumption identi￿ed as important environmental policy targets, namely, energy use, organic food
consumption, personal transport and water use. As part of the activity, a questionnaire on environment-
related household behavior covering each of the above ￿ve areas was designed and a web-based access panel
was used in early 2008 to implement the household survey in ten countries representing the three OECD
regions (North America, Europe and Asia-Paci￿c): Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Ko-
rea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Approximately 1,000 households per country participated
1Within the OECD region, municipal waste generation increased by about 58 percent from 1980 to 2000 and 4.6 percent
between 2000 and 2005; under the assumption of no new policies, total municipal waste is projected to increase by 38 percent
from 2005 to 2030 and per capita municipal waste by 25 percent (from 557 kg to 694 kg) over the same period [27].
2In 2005, for example, households produced over 75 percent of municipal waste in Korea, Germany, the U.K., Mexico,
Belgium, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Luxembourg, Denmark and Spain [27].
2in the study (10,251 in total) providing information on socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics
and on policy variables in each of the areas under consideration.
In this paper, the 2008 OECD household-level dataset is employed to examine several questions per-
taining to recycling behavior and waste prevention, including (i) whether user fees for waste disposal have
signi￿cant e⁄ects on waste recycling rates relative to ￿ at fees and whether these e⁄ects vary signi￿cantly
by material and/or by type of unit pricing, (ii) whether the presence of a recycling program strengthens or
weakens the impact of a user fee system on recycling and, if so, whether there is signi￿cant variation across
materials, (iii) the extent to which household waste recycling decisions depend on attributes of recycling
programs and whether there is signi￿cant variation across materials, (iv) how general attitudes towards
the environment in￿ uence waste recycling levels and whether the presence of economic incentives and/or
other forms of governmental intervention erodes or enhances the relevance of intrinsic motivation, and (v)
whether user fees have signi￿cant e⁄ects on waste prevention relative to ￿ at fees.
The empirical literature on municipal waste management is mostly concerned with waste production
and recycling decisions and focuses on the e⁄ects of socio-demographic variables and unit pricing systems on
such decisions, although there are some recent attempts to quantify the role of attitudes and the importance
of cultural and social in￿ uences in the decision-making process. In general, there is some agreement that
user fees for waste disposal, mostly bag-based systems, are e⁄ective at reducing waste and/or increasing
recycling [4, 5, 10, 13, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 31, 35], although there are instances in which they have no
impact on waste disposal decisions [17, 19, 22, 24, 30, 33]. While the impact of unit pricing on waste
disposal or recycling is well documented, little to nothing is known about its impact on source reduction
and on consumption and/or consumption patterns. Furthermore, although di⁄erent types of unit pricing
(for example, bag- or volume-based, subscription-based, frequency-based) are considered in the literature,3
there exists minimal evidence about their relative e⁄ects. In most of the available comparative analyses,
a bag-based program is more e⁄ective at reducing waste and, to a lesser extent, at increasing recycling
than a block payment system [5, 24, 26, 35]. In a more comprehensive analysis of di⁄erent types of unit
pricing, weight- and bag-based programs have comparable e⁄ects on waste management decisions but
perform better than frequency- and subscription-based programs [5]. In terms of its impact on recycling,
a frequency-based program is however equivalent to a weight-based system [33].
In addition to user fees, governments often rely on recycling programs as a means of diverting waste
3A subscription-based program entails households to pre-commit to a certain number of bags over a given period of time
for which they pay independently of whether they use them. In terms of the unit of measurement upon which a payment is
established, a subscription-based program is not much di⁄erent from a bag-based program, although variation in average and
marginal fees is likely to result across blocks or levels of commitment under the former but not under the latter.
3from land￿lls. There is evidence that communities with recycling programs have higher recycling rates
but not necessarily for every type of recyclables. Furthermore, curbside recycling programs do tend to
be more e⁄ective in the presence of a unit pricing system, and vice versa [4, 30]. In general, households
are sensitive to the time intensity of recycling activities and respond favorably to initiatives intended to
make collection more accessible [22, 23, 30] or to reduce sorting requirements [23]. Households are also
responsive to changes in collection frequency and recycle more as collection becomes more frequent [10, 23].
Knowledge about recycling programs has a positive e⁄ect on whether households recycle [30] but experience
with recycling programs may not contribute to increasing the probability of recycling consistently across
di⁄erent types of recyclables [22]. If curbside recycling is based on mandatory participation, independently
of whether unit pricing is in place, it is however not clear whether and how households￿decisions over
recycling are a⁄ected.
Another policy instrument that is often implemented, although limited to particular waste items,
is a refundable deposit system. Very little is known about the empirical impact of such a policy on
households￿waste disposal and recycling activities in spite of the extensive theoretical work that supports
their implementation [1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 28].
Although educational programs are not commonly considered policy instruments, there is some evidence
suggesting that they can be of assistance in waste diversion e⁄orts. Environmental activism or awareness
and knowledge about available management options do in fact contribute to less waste discarding and
more recycling [5, 20, 22, 25, 30]. Particularly interesting is the ￿nding that knowledge and social in￿ uence
from neighbours, friends and family members are the most e⁄ective predictors of recycling, implying that,
once educated about recycling (importance, availability and how to recycle quickly and conveniently),
individuals tend to recycle more [20]. Less commonly studied are attitudinal elements of in￿ uence and the
limited evidence seems to suggest that they can play a role in waste disposal decisions. A positive attitude
towards composting does in fact lead to a lower demand for garbage collection services while the perception
that recycling is di¢ cult induces households to recycle less [33]. Some recent evidence also suggests that
moral and social motivations can positively a⁄ect households￿recycling decisions [2, 16], although it is not
clear whether and how the presence of economic incentives or mandatory recycling a⁄ects their relevance.
The question about possible interaction e⁄ects between policy instruments and socio-demographic or
attitudinal characteristics is an important one and as relevant to policy makers as the question about
possible substitution or complementary e⁄ects among di⁄erent policy instruments. Although limiting, the
available evidence does suggest that policy-induced changes in waste disposal and recycling are a⁄ected by
4socio-demographic variables. Speci￿cally, the e⁄ect of unit pricing is smaller in low-income households, in
households that subscribe to more daily newspapers, for households with infants and for married couples
[14]. Unit pricing is also more e⁄ective in larger households but is less e⁄ective among home-owners [35].
As for the e⁄ect of external intervention (through economic incentives or regulatory measures) on intrinsic
motivation, there could either be a crowding out, if the intervention is perceived to be controlling, or a
crowding in, if it is perceived to be acknowledging [11]. Although there exists some evidence suggesting
that, when households have strong moral motives for environmentally responsible behavior, policies relying
on economic incentives may be ine⁄ective as they may undermine individuals￿sense of civic duty [12], there
is support to date in the speci￿c household waste area for a crowding in with either no erosion of personal
motives in the presence of economic incentives or perceived mandatory recycling [16], or a large proportion
of the positive e⁄ect of unit pricing on recycling and composting attributable to personal norms and
self-e¢ cacy beliefs [34].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, the dataset is described; in Section 3,
the estimation procedures employed are detailed; in Section 4, results are presented and commented upon
in relation to existing studies; in Section 5, policy recommendations are drawn based upon the empirical
￿ndings of the analysis; ￿nally, in Section 6, concluding remarks are given.
2 Data and Variables
The data set employed in this study was gathered by Lightspeed Online Research Inc. for the OECD
in February 2008 through an international web-based panel that involved 10,251 respondents.4 The ex-
planatory variables used are listed with brief descriptions in Table 1. Aside from variables commonly
considered in the empirical study of household waste decisions (age, household size, education, etc.), the
list includes attitudinal characteristics (rank of environmental concerns, relevance of waste generation as
an environmental concern, environmental attitude and concern for environmental issues), three four-point
Likert variables to capture the extent of relevance (from not at all important with a value of 1 to very
important with a value of 4) of recycling motives (environmental bene￿ts, the belief that recycling is a
civic duty and the desire to be seen as a responsible citizen), an indicator to re￿ ect the perception that
recycling is mandatory, and a four-point Likert variable (from not at all important with a value of 1 to
very important with a value of 4) to measure the importance of mandatory recycling, whenever it is an
4In light of possible sample bias (due to the means of implementation of the survey) and strategic bias (due to the nature of
the survey), the OECD performed several qualitative data checks on socio-demographic variables and other variables speci￿c
to the ￿ve areas of household consumption considered in the survey. The results of the data corroboration can be found at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/19/44101274.pdf.
5applicable motive, in motivating recycling.
To capture possible linkages between unit pricing and recycling services and between di⁄erent types
of motivation (economic versus moral and/or social), as well as possible di⁄erences in how unit pricing
a⁄ects di⁄erent segments of the population, various interaction indicators are also constructed. For possible
complementary e⁄ects among policies, an indicator is created for each material to allow for any interaction
between the presence of unit pricing and the presence of any type of recycling service (door-to-door service,
drop o⁄, refundable deposit system and non-refundable deposit system). For possible crowding in or out
e⁄ects of unit pricing, interaction variables are constructed between the presence of unit pricing and whether
recycling is perceived to be mandated, the importance of taking the environmental bene￿ts of recycling
into account, and the extent to which recycling is motivated by a sense of civic duty or by a desire to be
seen as a responsible citizen. Interaction variables are also created between the presence of unit pricing and
income, the number of rooms and whether the residence is owned, is a house, has a garden or is located in
an urban/suburban area.
[TABLES 1 and 2]
We provide some summary statistics pertaining to policy instruments (collection services, ￿nancing
methods, collection frequency and recycling intensities for the ￿ve recyclable materials) for the entire
sample in Table 2. In general, and not unexpectedly, door-to-door and drop o⁄programs are more common
than refundable deposit and bring back with no refund systems, although curbside collection is more
widespread in Australia, Canada and Korea while collection at drop o⁄ centers are more prevalent in
the Czech Republic, France, Italy and Sweden. Across the ￿ve materials, refundable deposit systems are
mostly implemented for glass, particularly in Canada and the Czech Republic, and plastic, particularly in
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Of the ten countries, Mexico has the highest proportion of households
reporting no service across the ￿ve materials.
In terms of charges, if any, households pay for the collection and management of mixed waste, ￿ at fees
are widely used in every country but Korea where most households pay according to volume and Mexico
where over 40 percent of the respondents report facing no charge. Of the remaining systems, charging
households according to their size is common in Italy and, to a lesser extent, in the Czech Republic. Mixed
waste is mostly collected at least once a week, with France, Italy, Korea and Mexico showing higher rates
for more frequent collection. Recycling participation tends to be relatively high for each material but food
and, to a lesser extent, aluminum, and in each country but Korea. Korea has a lower participation rate for
glass, plastic, aluminum and paper recycling but a higher participation rate for food recycling. Aluminum
6recycling participation is also quite low in France, Italy and Norway (zero percent recycling reported by
around 40 percent of respondents) and extremely low in the Czech Republic and Netherlands (zero percent
recycling reported by around 80 percent of respondents). Although the lower participation rates in Korea
do not seem to be linked to an absence of services (which is noticeably greater than in the other countries),
the lower participation rates for aluminum recycling in the Czech Republic and Netherlands and, to a lesser
extent, in France and Italy are consistent with the higher proportions of respondents in these countries
reporting having no service.
In this paper, two separate but related decisions are considered: recycling and waste prevention. For
each decision, two questions are posited: whether to participate and, if so, to what extent to participate.
For the recycling decision, the relevant dependent variables are: (1) indicators for recycling particular
materials (glass, plastic, aluminum, paper and food) and (2) proportions of materials recycled as captured
by integers 1 to 5 (approximately 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%). For the waste prevention decision, the
dependent variables considered are: (1) an indicator for taking a recycling logo into account in purchasing
decisions and (2) the regularity of purchasing/using re￿llable containers through the assignment of 1 to
the ￿Never￿option, 2 to the ￿Occasionally￿option, 3 to the ￿Often￿option and 4 to the ￿Always￿option.
3 Methodology
To assess the impact of the above de￿ned explanatory variables on household recycling and waste prevention
behaviour, binary probit and ordered probit speci￿cations are employed. Speci￿cally, a probit analysis is
used to study the decisions about whether to recycle and whether to engage in waste prevention, and an
ordered probit analysis for the decisions about the proportion of recyclable materials to recycle and the
regularity of purchasing/using re￿llable containers (see the Appendix for a brief outline of the probit and
ordered probit models). As it is quite possible for the decision of recycling a particular material to be
correlated with the decision of recycling a di⁄erent material, a multivariate probit analysis is also carried
out for the recycling participation decisions about the ￿ve materials under consideration. Although the
costs and bene￿ts of recycling a particular material depend upon its volume and weight characteristics as
well as upon the type of service available for its collection, thus suggesting that the decision of recycling that
material is independent of recycling participation decisions pertaining to other materials, there are valid
arguments suggesting otherwise. Among such arguments, (i) waste management policies targeting recycling
may be introduced simultaneously for di⁄erent types of materials and, in the speci￿c case of drop o⁄service,
centres may be placed in the same area even when co-mingling di⁄erent materials is not permitted; (ii)
7recycling may entail ￿xed costs associated, for example, with the collection of information about available
collection services and the purchase of additional bins so that the incremental cost of recycling an additional
material may decrease when another material is already being recycled; (iii) economies of scope may exist
as sorting a particular material is equivalent to sorting, at least partially, the other materials.











for m = 1;:::; M, where M is the number of equations (or materials in the present case). The error
terms are distributed as a multivariate normal variable with a mean of 0 and a covariance matrix V with
Vmg = 1 if m = g, where m; g = 1;:::; M, and Vmg = ￿mg = ￿gm if m 6= g. Estimation of multivariate
probit models requires the computation of multivariate normal probability distribution functions which, for
integrals of level greater than three, can be accomplished with simulation methods. One of such methods is
the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) algorithm which is based upon the idea that the joint probabilities
can be written as a succession of conditional probabilities.
4 Results
The results of the empirical models estimated with a probit (binary, multivariate or ordered) procedure
are presented and discussed below according to whether the questions are about recycling (Tables 3a, 3b
and 4) or waste prevention (Table 5).
4.1 Determinants of Recycling
The results of the multivariate analysis (Table 3a) suggest that the decisions of recycling di⁄erent materials
are correlated. In fact, the hypothesis that the ten o⁄-diagonal coe¢ cients of the variance-covariance matrix
are simultaneously equal to zero is rejected, with ￿2(10) = 1414:57, at 1 percent.5 Association is always
positive (that is, recycling a particular material has a positive in￿ uence on the decision to recycle another
material) and is stronger among glass, plastic, aluminum and paper, which tend to be recycled together
with the same type of collection service. Association between food and any of the remaining materials is
still positive but rather low ranging from 0.15 (between food and glass) to 0.23 (between food and paper).
5These coe¢ cients (￿ij for i;j = 1;:::;5 with i 6= j and ￿ij = ￿ji) measure the strength of linear association between
recycling a particular material and recycling any of the remaining materials.
8In general, country ￿xed e⁄ects are signi￿cant for both the decision about whether to recycle and that
about how much to recycle, suggesting that institutional and cultural factors, which tend to be country
speci￿c, play an important role in household recycling behavior. More speci￿cally, Sweden tends to enjoy a
higher recycling participation rate than the Czech Republic and France for all materials, Italy and Mexico
for all materials but food, and the Netherlands and Norway for all materials but paper and food. Sweden
has however a lower participation rate than Korea and, with the exception of food, Australia. Relative to
Canada, Sweden has a comparable recycling participation rate for glass, aluminum and paper, a lower rate
for plastic, and a higher rate for food. Not only does Sweden have a higher recycling participation rate but
also a higher recycling intensity; in fact, with the exceptions of Italy, Korea and Norway for the recycling of
food, households in Sweden tend to recycle greater proportions of their recyclable materials. No signi￿cant
di⁄erence in intensity exists, however, for aluminum recycling between Sweden and Australia, Canada
and Korea, for paper recycling between Sweden and the Netherlands and Norway, and for food recycling
between Sweden and the Netherlands.
Being married or living as a couple has a positive e⁄ect on recycling participation only for plastic and on
recycling intensity for glass, plastic, aluminum and paper. Men tend to participate less in plastic and paper
recycling but have higher recycling participation and intensity for aluminum. Age is also an important
factor: in general, young individuals participate less in recycling and tend to recycle less, with plastic being
the only recyclable out of the ￿ve materials considered in the empirical analysis for which young individuals
have both a higher recycling participation and a higher recycling intensity. Household size does not seem
to matter for members of at least ￿ve years of age; however the number of children below ￿ve reduces glass,
plastic and paper recycling. Education matters mostly at low levels with individuals without a high school
diploma recycling less glass, plastic, aluminum and paper than individuals with a post-graduate degree; for
glass recycling, however, individuals with a university degree tend to have higher participation and intensity
than individuals without high school, with high school or with some post-secondary education. Employment
status is most relevant for the recycling of aluminum with those working on a full-time or part-time basis,
retirees, househusbands/wives and students recycling more; retirees also participate more in the recycling
of plastic, together with those holding a full-time position, and food while househusbands/wives have a
higher participation rate for paper recycling. Among individuals with a job or in retirement, middle/senior
executives and salaried (o¢ ce) employees participate less in the recycling of plastic and aluminum and
recycle smaller proportions of aluminum and food. Income seems to matter only for the recycling of glass
and, to a lesser extent, for the recycling of plastic and aluminum, although its marginal e⁄ect is very low
9suggesting that di⁄erences in recycling are most noticeable when very rich individuals are compared to
very poor individuals; speci￿cally, richer individuals are more likely to recycle glass and tend to recycle
larger proportions of glass, plastic and aluminum.
Household characteristics (whether the primary residence is owned, is a house, has a garden or is in a
suburban/urban area, how many rooms, excluding bathrooms, it has and how long it has been the primary
residence) are mostly signi￿cant. Ownership and size of residence as captured by the number of rooms tend
to increase recycling with the former variable having however no signi￿cant e⁄ect on food recycling and
the latter having no signi￿cant e⁄ect on plastic and aluminum recycling. The presence of a garden matters
only for food recycling although it has a positive e⁄ect on recycling participation for glass and plastic.
Having a house (detached or semi-detached) tends to reduce the probability of recycling glass, plastic and
paper but to increase recycling participation and intensity for food. Living in an urban or suburban area
has a negative e⁄ect only on food recycling. Finally, having lived in the primary residence for more than
15 years, which would imply a stronger neighborhood attachment, has a positive e⁄ect on both recycling
participation and intensity.
The evidence supporting the importance of attitudinal characteristics in recycling decisions is strong.
Of the four variables included in the empirical analysis which capture individuals￿attitudes towards waste
generation and, more generally, towards the environment, the index measuring the level of concern for
environmental problems (ENVCNCRN_INDX) has a positive e⁄ect on glass, plastic, aluminum and food
recycling. The marginal e⁄ects in Table 3b, which are computed at the mean values of the independent
variables, suggest that a unit increase in ENVCNCRN_INDX, holding the other variables at their mean
values, leads to a increase in the probability of recycling participation by approximately 0.05 for aluminum
and 0.02 for glass, plastic and food. The index summarizing individuals￿environmental attitude based on
the extent of agreement or disagreement with ￿ve statements about the environment (ENVATTIT_INDX)
increases recycling for glass, plastic and aluminum. In terms of marginal e⁄ects, a unit increase in EN-
VATTIT_INDX, holding the other explanatory variables at their mean values, increases the probability of
recycling participation by approximately 0.04 for aluminum and 0.01 for glass and plastic. Of the remaining
two variables describing environmental attitudes (ENVRANK and WSTE_CNCRN), WSTE_CNCRN,
an indicator which records whether waste generation is of concern, has generally no relevance in recy-
cling decisions, although it reduces aluminum recycling and increases the intensity of glass recycling. The
ranking of environmental concerns (ENVRANK), on the other hand, reduces recycling participation for
aluminum and paper (by approximately 0.01 when environmental concerns move down in their ranking by
10one place, holding the other variables at their mean values) and recycling intensity for every material but
plastic and food.
The results for the e⁄ects of the indices included in the analysis to capture di⁄erent types of motiva-
tion for recycling (MTVRCYLENVR_LRKT, MTVRCYLDUTY_LRKT, and MTVRCYLRESP_LRKT)
suggest that one of the most important factors motivating recycling in general (that is, across the ￿ve ma-
terials) is whether and the extent to which it is considered to be bene￿cial for the environment. This
￿nding resonates with the conclusion that attitudes towards the environment are far more important in
recycling decisions than attitudes towards waste generation. Of the two indices re￿ ecting personal motives
for recycling based on social considerations, MTVRCYLDUTY_LRKT, which signals the presence (and
measures the importance) of a sense of civic duty, is quite relevant in inducing individuals to recycle more,
independently of the material; furthermore, there is no evidence that the positive e⁄ect of MTVRCYL-
DUTY_LRKT decreases as user charges for waste disposal are introduced (that is, there is no crowding
out). On the other hand, MTVRCYLRESP_LRKT, which signals the presence (and measures the im-
portance) of a social pressure to act responsibly (and thus a desire to be seen as a responsible citizen), is
mostly insigni￿cant but has a negative e⁄ect on food recycling intensity that however tends to be lower
under a unit pricing system as re￿ ected in the positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of the interaction term between
the presence of unit pricing and MTVRCYLRESP_LRKT.
The presence of a unit pricing system for waste disposal, whether based on volume or weight or fre-
quency, does not have a strong e⁄ect on the decision of whether to recycle; participation in aluminum and
food recycling is however higher by 0.15 and 0.24 under a weight-based fee program while participation
in paper and food recycling is higher by 0.07 and 0.21 under a volume-based fee program. Weight- and
frequency-based charges have quite a positive e⁄ect on food recycling but are otherwise ine⁄ective; on
the other hand, volume-based charges have signi￿cant and positive e⁄ects on recycling intensity for every
material but plastic. Although the results do suggest that economic instruments (that is, user fees for
waste disposal) can promote recycling, the evidence is not as convincing as one would expect, especially for
charges levied according to weight and frequency, based on theoretical predictions and empirical ￿ndings
in most of the studies on recycling (for example, [5, 10]). As in [22], one of the very few studies which
reports no signi￿cance for unit pricing, most of the observations (about 80 percent) come from communities
without some form of unit pricing, which either charge a ￿ at fee or a fee based on the size of the household
or do not charge at all for waste collection. Of the remaining observations, 1,108 (or 12.6 percent) are from
communities with a volume-based fee, 405 (or 4.6 percent) from communities with a frequency-based fee,
11and 241 (or 2.7 percent) from communities with a weight-based fee.
When unit pricing is assessed in conjunction with collection services for recyclables, the evidence based
on the estimated coe¢ cients does not suggest that the presence of collection programs for recyclables is
likely to increase the e⁄ectiveness of unit pricing rather than to decrease it. Hence, from a policy point
of view, collection services for recyclables and unit pricing may be substitutable as opposed to being
complementary approaches, a result which may counter the ￿nding in the literature that unit pricing
is more e⁄ective if combined with curbside recycling and vice versa [4]. The absence of any evidence
supporting complementarity between unit pricing and collection services for recyclables (mostly curbside
and drop o⁄), along with the presence (in the cases of plastic, aluminum and food) of some evidence
supporting substitutability between the two policies, may explain why user charges (particularly, volume-
and weight-based fees as frequency-based fees do not directly provide incentives to recycle) are not found
to be e⁄ective at increasing recycling participation. Indeed, when observations with curbside collection for
recyclables are excluded from the empirical analysis, the results of the ordered probit estimation, which are
reported in Table 5 only for the relevant variables (namely, curbside collection of recyclables and weight-,
volume- and frequency-based fees), show that unit pricing based on volume or frequency has always a
positive e⁄ect on recycling independently of the material while unit pricing based on weight has a positive
e⁄ect on glass, aluminum and food recycling.
Although a unit pricing system for mixed waste and a door-to-door collection program for recyclables
seem to be substitutes, the former may be the redundant policy in that its positive e⁄ect on recycling dis-
appears when observations with curbside collection for recyclables are excluded from the analysis; the e⁄ect
on recycling of a door-to-door collection program is however always present and positive independently
of whether observations with a user fee system are excluded. This di⁄erence is likely attributable to the
di⁄erent channels through which the two policies a⁄ect recycling. A door-to-door collection program has
a direct e⁄ect on recycling through a reduction in its time cost; a unit pricing system has an indirect e⁄ect
on recycling through a reduction in the cost of disposing of mixed waste. Hence, the time cost of recycling
in the absence of curbside collection may be a more relevant consideration in recycling decisions than
its money bene￿t in the presence of unit pricing. When curbside collection for recyclables is introduced,
individuals tend to recycle more in light of the reduced time cost of recycling; a unit pricing system for
mixed waste may then provide no additional incentive (in the form of money saving) for recycling. When
curbside collection for recyclables is not available, the money saving aspect of recycling in the presence
of a unit pricing system may be su¢ cient to o⁄set the time cost of recycling (either through a drop-o⁄
12program or a deposit system with or without refund), thus inducing individuals to recycle.
Among the variables which are most consistently signi￿cant across the ￿ve materials and in￿ uence
recycling participation and intensity in accordance with theoretical predictions, there are: whether some
type of collection service is in place, the frequency of curbside collection if available, whether recycling is
mandated by the government as captured by the applicability of mandatory recycling as a factor motivating
recycling, and the frequency of mixed waste pick-up. In general, having any type of service (door-to-
door, drop o⁄, bring back with refund, bring back with no refund) results in more recycling. In terms of
marginal e⁄ects, the availability of curbside recycling has its greatest impact on the probability of recycling
aluminum, which increases by approximately 0.43 compared to 0.37 for food, 0.21 for plastic, 0.16 for paper
and 0.11 for glass. Under a drop o⁄ system, the largest impact on recycling participation is detected for
aluminum with a 0.34 increase, followed by food with a 0.26 increase, plastic with a 0.15 increase and
both glass and paper with a 0.11 increase. Under a refundable deposit system, the probability of recycling
increases by 0.22 for aluminum, 0.16 for food, 0.12 for plastic and 0.05 for both glass and paper. Finally,
under a bring back with no refund system, food experiences the largest increase in recycling probability,
followed by aluminum and the other three materials in exactly the same order as under a drop o⁄ system
or a refundable deposit system; speci￿cally, the probability of recycling participation increases by 0.26
for food, 0.15 for aluminum, 0.07 for plastic and 0.03 for glass and paper. Hence, collection programs
for recyclables seem to be most e⁄ective for aluminum and food and least e⁄ective for glass and paper.
Furthermore, of the four types of collection programs, curbside recycling is the most e⁄ective independently
of the material while a refundable deposit system is the least e⁄ective for food and a bring back with no
refund system is the least e⁄ective for the remaining materials (glass, plastic, aluminum and paper).
While the presence of curbside collection for recyclables increases recycling, the frequency of collection
has a negative impact on both recycling participation and intensity for all materials, although the impact
is statistically signi￿cant only for plastic, aluminum and paper in the decision about whether to recycle,
and for every material but food in the decision about how much to recycle. However there does not seem
to be any di⁄erence in terms of recycling participation between once a week collection and less than once
a week collection for any of the materials but aluminum. Increasing how often mixed waste is collected
also reduces recycling, with food recycling experiencing the largest adjustment in participation. For glass
and paper, recycling participation tends to be statistically responsive only to a shift from less than once a
week collection to once a week collection.
Under mandatory recycling, individuals tend to exhibit higher recycling participation and intensity,
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factor in motivating their recycling decisions are not likely to recycle more, with the exception of food and,
for the participation decision although with the opposite e⁄ect, glass. In terms of marginal e⁄ects, the
probability of recycling when mandatory recycling is an applicable factor motivating recycling is higher
by 0.06 for glass, 0.04 for plastic and 0.05 for paper; furthermore, as mandatory recycling becomes a more
relevant consideration in recycling decisions, the probability of recycling increases by 0.03 for food but
remains unchanged for the other materials. The presence of unit pricing reduces the e⁄ect of mandatory
recycling on recycling participation for glass, plastic and aluminum, and on recycling intensity for glass
and paper.
As for the interaction terms between unit pricing and some socio-demographic characteristics, the
evidence is a bit scattered with the presence of unit pricing strengthening the e⁄ect of (1) income on
plastic and food recycling participation, (2) living in a house on glass and plastic recycling participation,
(3) living in an urban or suburban area on glass and plastic recycling participation, and (4) having a garden
on aluminum recycling participation, while weakening the e⁄ect of (1) owning the primary residence on
glass recycling intensity, aluminum recycling participation and paper recycling participation and intensity,
(2) living in a house on food recycling participation and intensity, and (3) size of primary residence as
re￿ ected in the number of rooms (excluding bathrooms) on food recycling participation.
[TABLES 3a, 3b, 4]
4.2 Determinants of Waste Prevention
In the absence of consumption ￿gures and, more speci￿cally, information on the waste content of consump-
tion, the question about waste prevention and the factors contributing to waste prevention is addressed
indirectly through a binary question about the importance of recycling logo information in purchasing
decisions and a question about using re￿llable containers involving an ordinal choice over regularity of use.
Based on the country ￿xed e⁄ects, with the Czech Republic excluded from the binary probit estimation
because of unavailability of a recycling logo, there exist institutional and cultural factors which yield
di⁄erences across countries. For example, while the results of the binary probit estimation suggest that the
probability of engaging in waste prevention as captured by the probability of taking into account recycling
logo/label information in purchasing decisions is higher in Sweden than in any of the remaining eight
countries, the results of the ordered probit estimation suggest that the intensity of waste prevention as
captured by how regularly re￿llable containers are used is, for the most part, lower in Sweden than in the
14other countries.
In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, relevant factors include: gender, age, education, employ-
ment status, income, presence of a garden and type of area of residency. In the estimation of the intensity
of use for re￿llable containers, only four of these variables matter, namely, the male, age, garden and ur-
ban/suburban indicators. To be precise, older and/or male individuals, individuals without a garden and
individuals living in an urban or suburban area tend to use re￿llable containers less regularly. At the same
time, younger and/or male individuals as well as individuals with access to a garden are more likely to take
recycling logo information into account in purchasing decisions; individuals living in an urban or suburban
area, on the other hand, do not display any signi￿cantly di⁄erent behavior in terms of considering recy-
cling log information in purchasing decisions than individuals living in other types of area. Furthermore,
individuals working full time, those working part time and househusbands/wives are less likely to consider
recycling labels in their purchasing decisions by 0.08, 0.07 and 0.09, respectively. Richer individuals are less
likely to pay attention to recycling labels when shopping, although any noticeable di⁄erence in behavior
between rich and poor individuals requires a substantial income gap as the marginal e⁄ect of income is
quite negligible.
Of the variables characterizing attitudes towards the environment or motivation for recycling, most
are signi￿cant and have the expected e⁄ect on waste prevention. In particular, individuals who show a
greater concern for environmental problems are more likely to engage in waste prevention both in terms
of accounting for recycling labels in purchasing decisions and using re￿llable containers more regularly.
Individuals who rank environmental concerns high in order of importance or show a stronger attitude
towards the environment are more likely to take recycling labels into account in purchasing decisions
but there is no evidence that they make more extensive use of re￿llable containers. As with the case
for the recycling participation and intensity decisions, concern for waste generation is not an important
determinant of waste prevention decisions. However individuals who believe that recycling is bene￿cial
for the environment or that it is a civic duty tend to engage more in waste prevention activities while
individuals who believe that recycling is a social responsibility tend to use re￿llable containers more often
but are not more likely to account for recycling labels when shopping. Finally, individuals who face
mandatory recycling are more likely to account for recycling labels in their purchasing decisions but tend
to become less likely to do so as mandatory recycling becomes a more important consideration in their
recycling decisions.
Unit pricing, whether based on weight, volume or frequency, does not seem to a⁄ect whether recycling
15labels are taken into account in purchasing decisions but does increase the probability of using re￿llable
containers more regularly. The presence of recycling services is, for the most part, statistically insigni￿cant
in both the binary probit estimation and the ordered probit estimation. There exists some evidence
however suggesting that individuals would pay greater attention to recycling labels if (i) their waste were
to be collected less frequently, (ii) their recycled glass were to be collected less frequently, (iii) a bring back
with no return system were not available for glass, (iv) curbside collection were available for tin and steel
cans (aluminum), (v) tin and steel cans were collected at the curb more than once a week, and (vi) a drop
o⁄ system were available for tin and steel cans. Individuals would also use re￿llable containers more often
if a drop o⁄ system or a refundable deposit system were in place for tin and steel cans.
[TABLE 5]
5 Policy Implications
A result which is common to the two issues addressed in this paper about recycling and waste prevention
relates to the presence of institutional and cultural elements, as captured by country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects,
explaining variation in household behavior across countries. An important implication of this ￿nding is that
policy makers may derive some useful lessons by looking closely at countries, such as Sweden, which tend
to consistently exhibit a more environmentally friendly behavior. Among factors to consider are countries￿
approaches to waste management and views on environmental problems when the whole product chain is
taken into account. As the empirical analyses in this paper are based on partial equilibrium models which
focus on the interaction between households and the government, variation across countries may result
from di⁄erences in policies, regulations and actions taken at di⁄erent stages of the product chain as well
as di⁄erences on the supply side of collection services. Sweden in particular takes a holistic approach to
waste management (and environmental problems in general) in that it holds producers and distributors
of goods responsible for the waste they produce; in other words, companies are responsible by law for
the collection of the entire waste stream resulting from their products either directly or through public or
private contractors.
Of the four variables describing environmental concerns and attitudes, the one speci￿c to waste genera-
tion has no impact on waste prevention and recycling e⁄orts, with the exception of the decision about how
much glass to recycle. The remaining variables do matter, almost consistently across the ￿ve types of recy-
clables. The importance of attitudes towards the environment in general (as opposed to waste generation)
has implications for the design of e⁄ective informational measures targeting recycling and waste preven-
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changing perceptions, motivations and knowledge levels. Hence, informational campaigns that stress how
waste production contributes to environmental deterioration may be quite helpful in inducing individuals
to recycle more and produce less waste. Unlike other environmental issues (for example, car pollution,
climate change) to which individuals can relate more closely, waste generation may not be perceived as a
major environmental problem and may in fact be viewed more as a practical nuisance because of its space
requirement than as an environmental problem. That a favorable response may ensue from an increased
awareness of the environmental implications of waste generation is also supported by the ￿nding that in-
dividuals who believe that recycling is bene￿cial for the environment are more likely to recycle and engage
in waste prevention.
As social considerations constitute an important determinant of both recycling and waste prevention
decisions, informational measures that focus on social aspects may also assist in promoting recycling and
waste prevention. Although there are two sources of social motivation considered in this study, namely, a
belief that recycling is a civic duty and a desire to be seen as a responsible citizen, ￿ndings suggest that the
social dimension of waste management comes from the former and thus from a desire to act responsibly as
opposed to being seen as acting responsibly. Informational measures that build upon social considerations
may then be potentially more e⁄ective if they present waste reduction as a moral responsibility rather than
as a social pressure.
The evidence gathered in this study also suggests that information-based measures can coexist with
pricing-based schemes, that is, governments can simultaneously implement both types of intervention.
In fact, policies relying on economic incentives do not tend to reduce (or crowd out) individuals￿intrin-
sic motivation for environmentally responsible behavior. In some instances (for example, food recycling
participation), economic incentives may actually increase (or crowd in) individuals￿intrinsic motives for
environmentally responsible behavior and are thus more likely to be perceived as communicating norms
and responsibilities (that is, acknowledging).
In addition to stimulating personal motives by stressing social aspects of recycling and waste prevention
as well as their environmental implications, informational campaigns may also aid in facilitating the imple-
mentation of pricing instruments. Even if, distributional e⁄ects aside, pricing strategies can be considered
as an e⁄ective and e¢ cient way of managing environmental problems associated with private decision mak-
ing, they are often perceived as signi￿cantly reducing individuals￿quality of life and accordingly viewed as
unacceptable policies. Acceptability of pricing instruments may then be enhanced through informational
17campaigns that not only educate the public about the environmental implications of waste generation
but also clearly communicate how pricing policies can contribute to the alleviation of the environmental
problems resulting from waste production.
In spite of the signi￿cant body of evidence in the waste generation and recycling literature that points
to the contrary, user charges are not found to be very e⁄ective, particularly in the participation decisions.
The only recyclable for which any of the three types of unit pricing seems to signi￿cantly a⁄ect recycling
behavior is food; in fact, not only are individuals more likely to recycle food under either a weight-based
or a volume-based program (by 0.24 and 0.21) but they are also more likely to recycle larger proportions
of food under any of the three programs. Although the evidence in support of user charges is not as strong
as theory and existing empirical studies would suggest, it is not completely absent as a positive e⁄ect of
a volume-based unit pricing is detected in the decision about how much to recycle for all materials but
plastic and a positive e⁄ect of unit pricing in general (that is, a system which charges for waste disposal
either according to weight or volume or pick-up frequency) also comes up in the decision about how often
to use/purchase re￿llable containers.
That frequency-based pricing schemes are not e⁄ective is not surprising given that individuals facing
charges based on mixed waste collection frequency do not pay per unit of waste generated but per collection
and can avoid some of their disposal costs simply by storing more waste at home without necessarily
recycling more. That weight-based and volume-based charges are insigni￿cant is however quite unexpected.
Unfortunately, despite the greater policy heterogeneity resulting from the international setting, very few
observations in the dataset are drawn from communities with some form of unit pricing. In the absence
of strati￿cation of communities by policy, only 241 respondents report paying for mixed waste collection
by weight and 1,108 respondents report paying by volume. One result is that a unit pricing system
for the collection of mixed waste and a door-to-door program for the collection of recyclables are not
complements of one another, as previously gathered evidence suggests [4]. Furthermore, when unit pricing
is assessed only for households without access to curbside collection of recyclables, ￿ndings reveal that
weight- and frequency-based charges can also be e⁄ective at inducing individuals to recycle more, although
they remain insigni￿cant in the decision about whether to recycle. Unit pricing thus has no impact on
recycling participation for any material but food independently of whether curbside collection of recyclables
is available; however unit pricing is more e⁄ective at inducing recyclers to recycle more in the absence of
curbside collection of recyclables (see Table 5). Furthermore, volume-based charges seem to perform better
than weight- and frequency-based charges even in the absence of a door-to-door program; in fact, volume-
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impact on the recycling of plastic and paper and frequency-based fees do not a⁄ect the recycling of paper.
In contrast, when households with access to curbside collection of recyclables are not excluded from the
analysis, volume-based charges do not matter in the paper recycling intensity decision and frequency- and
weight-based charges only matter in the food recycling intensity decision. As a door-to-door collection
program for recyclables is always e⁄ective independently of whether user charges are implemented and
in both the decision about whether to recycle and the decision about how much to recycle, increasing
recycling may be more easily achievable with policies that focus on the time cost of recycling as opposed
to policies that stress the money bene￿t of recycling.
The evidence supporting the importance of the presence of a collection program for recyclables is quite
strong. In general, the presence of any type of service (door-to-door, drop o⁄, bring back with refund or
bring back without refund) increases recycling participation and intensity but has mostly no e⁄ect on waste
prevention. More speci￿cally, any type of service program but a bring back without refund system yields
bene￿ts in both the decision about whether to recycle and that about how much to recycle; a bring back
without refund system, on the other hand, does not a⁄ect how much glass individuals recycle, although it
still impacts whether individuals do recycle glass. Based on the marginal e⁄ects estimated for the binary
probit decision about recycling, a door-to-door program is as good as a drop o⁄ system for glass recycling
but preferable for any other recyclable. As curbside collection may be more costly to administer than
collection by means of a drop o⁄ center, the bene￿ts from the additional recycling under the former would
have to be weighed against its potentially higher provision cost. Hence, aluminum and food, for which
curbside collection brings about a larger bene￿t over and above the bene￿t from a drop o⁄ system, may
be better candidates for curbside collection.6 A drop o⁄ system performs always better than a refundable
deposit system and is particularly appealing for aluminum and food, both of which experience a larger
increase in recycling than the other materials (an extra 0.12 for aluminum and an extra 0.10 for food,
compared to an additional 0.06 for glass and paper and 0.03 for plastic). Finally, when a deposit refund
system is compared to a bring back without refund system, the former is preferable to the latter for any
material but food; not only a bring back without refund system has a larger e⁄ect on the probability of
recycling food than a refundable deposit system but it is also comparable in terms of its impact to a drop
o⁄ program. Needless to say, signi￿cant administrative cost di⁄erences may exist among the four types of
6Relative to a drop o⁄ system, food recycling increases by an additional 0.11 and aluminum recycling by an additional 0.09
when curbside collection is in place. On the other hand, the probability of recycling plastic increases by an additional 0.06
and that of recycling paper by an additional 0.05 when a door-to-door program is available as opposed to a drop o⁄ system.
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and for which material.
Although policy makers may consider mandating recycling to get individuals to recycle or to recycle
more, mandatory recycling may work for some materials (glass, plastic and paper) but not for others
(aluminum and food) and may yield smaller bene￿ts than a curbside or drop o⁄program. Under mandatory
recycling, the probability of increasing glass, plastic and paper recycling is in fact 0.06, 0.04 and 0.05 higher,
respectively, than in the absence of mandatory recycling, compared to 0.11, 0.21 and 0.16 in the presence
of a curbside program and to 0.11, 0.15 and 0.11 in the presence of a drop o⁄ program. Last, but not
least, mandatory recycling may have stronger side e⁄ects than recycling programs on whether and how
unit pricing impacts recycling intensity. In light of these considerations, mandatory recycling may not be
a desirable policy option and policy makers may be able to achieve better results by focusing on improving
accessibility of recycling services.
In implementing a collection program for recyclables, policy makers should keep in mind that such a
program may only succeed at targeting a particular aspect of waste management. Ideally, a policy-induced
behavioral adjustment should include both an increase in recycling and a decrease in waste generation
through a shift in consumption patterns in favor of products with less waste content and/or reusable
products. The evidence in this study points to the conclusion that the provision of recycling services does
not encourage individuals to produce less waste so that, for waste prevention, policy makers may have
to resort to additional mechanisms which may involve incentive structures at other stages of the product
chain. There is certainly signi￿cant variation in waste prevention across the ten countries, as re￿ ected in
the country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, which may be attributable to di⁄erences in waste management policies
at the production stage.
When a collection program is being contemplated, an important feature to consider is pick-up frequency.
While the ￿ndings of this study suggest that individuals take into account both the frequency of collection
of mixed waste and the frequency of curbside collection of recyclables, the behavioral response to an
increase in the latter is inconsistent with theoretical predictions. In fact, individuals tend to recycle less
as mixed waste is collected more frequently, as expected, but to recycle less as recyclables are collected
more frequently, which is unexpected. To increase recycling, policy makers should thus consider a less
frequent collection of mixed waste and, if they implement a door-to-door collection of recyclables, should
not necessarily opt for a more frequent collection of recyclables. It is quite possible, although further
investigation is necessary to con￿rm this interpretation, that there exist economies of scale in recycling
20activities, partly because of the preparation that is required every time recyclables are placed at the curb.
Because of this preparation or start up cost, individuals may ￿nd the process of getting recyclables ready
for collection less time consuming if they have to engage in it every two weeks as opposed to once (or even
more than once) a week. Individuals may thus react to a more frequent collection of recyclables simply by
recycling less to avoid incurring additional time costs which, from previous discussions in relation to unit
pricing, seem to constitute a more relevant factor in recycling decisions than monetary bene￿ts.
In terms of the estimated e⁄ects of socio-demographic factors on recycling and waste prevention, there
are a few lessons that can be drawn from the analysis which may aid policy makers in the design and
targeting of waste management policies. Speci￿cally, in deciding about which areas to target to increase
recycling, policy makers may give priority to those which have a high proportion of renters; in fact, not
only home-owners tend to recycle more so that intervention is less needed but they also respond negatively
to the implementation of a unit pricing system so that, if intervention does occur, measures based on
economic incentives may not represent the most e⁄ective way of in￿ uencing their behavior. Depending on
the material, policy makers may target areas with relatively young families more aggressively (for example,
for aluminum, paper and food); furthermore, they may be able to achieve better results, in terms of
recycling participation and intensity, by focusing on areas with families that have children under the age
of 5 and, in terms of waste prevention intensity, on urban/suburban areas where the e⁄ect of a unit pricing
system on the probability of recycling participation (for some materials, at least) is also stronger.
6 Concluding Remarks
The present study widens the scope of previous analysis and improves upon our understanding of house-
hold recycling and waste prevention behavior in a number of ways: (1) by relying upon a survey that
builds upon the lessons arising out of the existing literature but also attempts to address questions that
remain unanswered; (2) by bringing together key aspects of household behavior, namely, socio-demographic
characteristics (for example, income, age, education, household size) and attitudinal variables (for exam-
ple, environmental concerns, norms, values), thus capturing a broader spectrum of policy in￿ uences and
allowing for a more accurate assessment of the direct e⁄ects of socio-demographic factors and for the in-
vestigation of complementary e⁄ects among strategies that di⁄er in the assumptions about how behavior
can be changed (for example, through incentives, through informational campaigns); (3) by examining the
e⁄ects of a broad range of policy instruments (pricing, informational and regulatory); (4) by considering
the contributions of economic theory as well as of other social sciences, such as psychology and sociology, to
21household decision-making in order to provide a more accurate and realistic framework for the evaluation of
environmental policies; (5) allowing for correlation in behavior between materials in recycling decisions; (6)
adding an international dimension to the analysis through households across a cross-section of countries.
Although waste prevention is only measured indirectly through a couple of proxies, this study represents
the ￿rst attempt to assess the e⁄ects of socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics as well as policy
instruments (unit pricing, in particular) on activities related to waste prevention.
One of the key insights relates to the presence of strong intrinsic motivations for a more environmentally
responsible behavior. There is indeed a positive relation between environmental concern and/or attitude
and recycling or waste prevention, which suggests that more environmentally sensitive individuals tend
to recognize the environmental deterioration that results from waste production and to exhibit a greater
commitment to recycling and waste prevention activities such as taking recycling labels into account
when shopping and using/purchasing re￿llable containers. Correspondingly, individuals who are simply
concerned about waste generation do not tend to adjust their recycling and waste prevention e⁄orts.
Intrinsic motivations are also present in the form of moral/social considerations as individuals with a
stronger sense of civic duty tend to engage more extensively in recycling and waste prevention. On the
other hand, individuals who are motivated by a desire to be seen as acting responsibly are not more
environmentally responsible. An important implication of these ￿ndings is that there may be bene￿ts from
sensitizing individuals to environmental problems and educating them about the environmental impact of
waste production and the moral dimension of recycling and waste prevention.
The evidence gathered in this study is quite conducive to the conclusion that individuals do respond
favorably, in terms of recycling e⁄orts, to the presence of recycling services and that, the more accessible
such services are, the more responsive they become. Hence, curbside collection of recyclables yields better
results than the other three programs considered in the analysis (drop o⁄, refundable deposit and bring back
with no refund). Under curbside collection of recyclables, however, more frequent collection of recyclables
is not necessarily desirable contrary to ￿ndings in previous studies [10, 23]. The adverse e⁄ect of frequency
on individuals￿recycling behavior also transpires in the collection of garbage as, the more frequently their
garbage is collected, the less likely to recycle individuals are and the less they recycle.
The evidence on unit pricing is not as strong as one would expect based upon theoretical predictions
and previous empirical ￿ndings. Nevertheless, of the three types of unit pricing examined in the study
(weight-, volume-, and frequency-based), the volume-based system appears to be the most e⁄ective. An
important result is that unit pricing may have little to contribute when curbside recycling is in place,
22especially if weight-based or frequency-based charges are being considered, and curbside recycling may
have additional bene￿ts over and above those brought about by unit pricing.
In terms of waste prevention, the presence of unit pricing does not a⁄ect the decision about whether
to take recycling labels into account in purchasing decisions but does have a positive e⁄ect on the decision
about how often to use/purchase re￿llable containers instead of their alternatives. The evidence thus points
to some role that user charges may have in inducing individuals to alter their consumption patterns in
order to reduce waste as theory predicts.
While the evidence may suggest stronger support for curbside recycling than for unit pricing, there
are a few considerations about unit pricing that deserve mention. First, unit pricing does not seem to
crowd out intrinsic motivations for recycling but does reduce the positive e⁄ect that mandatory recycling
has on recycling participation and intensity (equivalently, mandatory recycling reduces the e⁄ects of unit
pricing). Second, there are speci￿c socio-demographic segments of the population which may respond to
unit pricing more or less favorably (for example, the e⁄ect of unit pricing on paper recycling is smaller
among homeowners; the e⁄ect on food recycling is smaller among those living in a house; the e⁄ect on
aluminum recycling participation is larger among those who have a garden; the e⁄ect on glass and plastic
recycling participation is larger among those living in an urban or suburban area). Third, the number of
observations in the data set which fall under each of the three types of unit pricing (weight- and frequency-
based, in particular) is very small and, as a result, the e⁄ects of each system may not be fully captured in
the analysis.
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7 Appendix
Binary and ordinal regression models can be derived from a latent-variable model which relates a latent
or unobserved variable y￿ ranging from ￿1 to 1 to the observed independent variables according to the
structural equation
y￿
i = ￿0xi + "i;
where ￿0 is the vector of coe¢ cients estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), x is the vector
of independent variables, " is a random term,7 and i denotes the observation. The idea of a latent y￿ is
that the underlying propensity (for example, to recycle or to recycle a particular proportion) generates the
observed state; although the propensity itself cannot be observed, a change in what is observed is triggered
by a change in y￿. The probability of an event occurring is thus given by the cumulative density function
(cdf) of " evaluated at given values of the independent variables.
7The error term could be distributed normally (probit speci￿cation) or logistically (logit speci￿cation). The two distribu-
tions di⁄er only in spread with the latter having thicker tails: var(") = ￿
2=3 with the logistic cdf and var(") = 1 with the
normal cdf. The two distributions can give di⁄erent results if the sample is unbalanced (that is, most of the outcomes are
similar with only few di⁄erences).








so that positive values of y￿ are observed as y = 1 while negative values of y￿ are observed as y = 0 and
the probability of the event occurring is given by





where ￿ denotes the normal cdf. In the ordinal case,
yi =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
1 if ￿ 1 = ￿0 ￿ y￿
i < ￿1
2 if ￿1 ￿ y￿
i < ￿2




J if ￿J￿1 ￿ y￿
i < ￿J = 1;
where J is the number of categories and ￿j is the cutpoint for j = 0;:::; J, and the probabilities of
household i falling into the J categories are given by
Pr(yi = 1 j xi) = ￿(￿1 ￿ ￿0xi) ￿ ￿(￿￿0xi)
Pr(yi = 2 j xi) = ￿(￿2 ￿ ￿0xi) ￿ ￿(￿1 ￿ ￿0xi)
Pr(yi = 3 j xi) = ￿(￿3 ￿ ￿0xi) ￿ ￿(￿2 ￿ ￿0xi)
:::




￿ ￿(￿J ￿ ￿0xi);
that is, the areas under the normal cdf between pairs of cutpoints.
27Table 1. Explanatory variables: definitions and descriptions  
Variable  Description  Variable  Description 
AUSTRALIA  Australia indicator  INCOME_CONT  Mid-point income in euros 
CANADA  Canada indicator  ROWNR  Ownership indicator 
CZECHREP  Czech Republic indicator  RESTYPE_HOUSE  House indicator 
FRANCE  France indicator  RESDROOMS  Number of bedrooms 
ITALY  Italy indicator  GARDEN  Garden indicator 
KOREA  Korea indicator  AREADESC_URBAN  Urban indicator 
MEXICO  Mexico indicator 
AREADESC_SUBURB
AN  Suburban indicator 
NETHERLANDS   Netherlands indicator  RESDYRS_CLASS_1  Less than 2 years living in residence indicator 
NORWAY  Norway indicator  RESDYRS_CLASS_2  2 to 5 years living in residence indicator 
STATUS_MARRIED  Married/living as a couple indicator  RESDYRS_CLASS_3  6 to 15 years living in residence indicator 
GENDER_MALE  Male indicator  ENVRANK  Rank of environmental concerns 
AGE_CLASS_1  Age 18 to 24 indicator  WSTE_CNCRN  Indicator for waste generation concern 
AGE_CLASS_2  Age 25 to 34 indicator  ENVCNCRN_INDX  Environmental concern index 
AGE_CLASS_3  Age 35 to 44 indicator  ENVATTIT_INDX  Environmental attitude index 
AGE_CLASS_4  Age 45 to 54 indicator  WSTCHRG_WEIGHT  Indicator for weight-based fee 
ADULTS  Number of adults  WSTCHRG_VOL  Indicator for volume-based fee 
UNDER5  Number of children under 5  WSTCHRG_FREQ  Indicator for frequency-based fee 
BETWEEN5AND18  Number of children between 5 and 18  COLLFREQ_CLASS_1  More than once a week mixed waste pick-up 
EDUC_CLASS_1  Indicator for no high school  COLLFREQ_CLASS_2  Once a week pick-up of mixed waste indicator 
EDUC_CLASS_2  Indicator for high school  RCYCLCOLDTD_X  Door-to-door service for material X indicator  
EDUC_CLASS_3  Some post-secondary education indicator  RCYCLFREQ_X_1  More than once a week pick-up of X indicator 
EDUC_CLASS_4  Bachelor’s degree indicator  RCYCLFREQ_X_2  Once a week pick-up of X indicator 
EMPL_FULLTIME  Full-time employment indicator  RCYCLCOLDOF_X  Drop-off service for X indicator 
EMPL_PARTTIME  Part-time employment indicator  RCYCLCOLRFD_X  Return with refund service for X indicator 
EMPL_RETIRED  Retired indicator  RCYCLCOLBBK_X  Return with no refund service for X indicator 
EMPL_HOMEMAKER  Homemaker indicator  UF_INCOME  Interaction between user fee and income 
EMPL_STUDENT  Student indicator  UF_RESROWNR  Interaction between user fee and ownership 
EMPL_LEAVE  In employment but not working indicator  UF_HOUSE  Interaction between user fee and house 
OCCUP_1  Liberal profession indicator  UF_RESDROOMS  Interaction between user fee and number of rooms 
OCCUP_2  Middle/senior executive indicator  UF_GARDEN  Interaction between user fee and garden 
OCCUP_3  Self-employed indicator  UF_URSUB  Interaction between user fee and urban/suburban 
OCCUP_4  Salaried employee indicator  UF_SERVICE_X  Interaction between user fee and any service for X 
OCCUP_5  Manual worker indicator  UF_MANDATED  Interaction between user fee and mandatory recycling 
MTVRCYLDUTY_LKT  Importance of belief that recycling is a civic duty  
UF_MTVRCYLDUTY_
LKT 
Interaction between user fee and importance of civic duty 
MTVRCYLRESP_LKT  Importance of desire to be seen as a responsible citizen 
UF_MTVRCYLRESP_
LKT 
Interaction between user fee and responsible citizen 
MTVRCYLMAND  Mandatory recycling as recycling motive indicator  MTVRCYLENVR_LKT  Importance of environmental benefits in motivation 
MTVRCYLMAND_LKT  Importance of mandatory recycling in motivation     
Note: Materials (X): GLAS = glass; PLST = plastic; MTAL = aluminum; PAPR = paper; FOOD = food. Table 2. Summary statistics for independent variables 
Variable    Mean (SD)    Mean (SD) 
    All observations    Unit Pricing
* 
Socio-demographic characteristics         
Married Indicator    0.62 (0.49)    0.52 (0.50) 
Male Indicator    0.48 (0.50)    0.44 (0.50) 
Age 18 to 24 Indicator    0.14 (0.34)    0.22 (0.42) 
Age 25 to 34 Indicator    0.21 (0.41)    0.26 (0.44) 
Age 35 to 44 Indicator    0.22 (0.41)    0.21 (0.40) 
Age 45 to 54 Indicator    0.19 (0.39)    0.15 (0.36) 
Number of Adults     2.24 (1.02)    2.48 (1.16) 
Number of Children under 5    0.20 (0.50)    0.23 (0.55) 
Number of Children between 5 and 18    0.45 (0.80)    0.51 (0.84) 
No High School Indicator    0.12 (0.33)    0.09 (0.29) 
High School Indicator    0.26 (0.44)    0.28 (0.45) 
Some Post-Secondary Education Indicator    0.27 (0.45)    0.26 (0.44) 
Bachelor’s Degree Indicator    0.24 (0.43)    0.28 (0.45) 
Employed Full-Time Indicator    0.48 (0.50)    0.44 (0.50) 
Employed Part-Time Indicator    0.12 (0.33)    0.13 (0.34) 
Retired Indicator    0.14 (0.34)    0.07 (0.25) 
Housewife Indicator    0.07 (0.26)    0.10 (0.30) 
Student Indicator    0.08 (0.27)    0.13 (0.33) 
In Employment but Not Working Indicator    0.12 (0.33)    0.02 (0.13) 
Liberal Profession Indicator
1    0.17 (0.37)
    0.17 (0.37) 
Middle/Senior Executive Indicator
1    0.16 (0.37)
    0.12 (0.33) 
Self-Employed Indicator
1    0.07 (0.26)
    0.07 (0.26) 
Salaried Employee Indicator
1    0.36 (0.48)    0.38 (0.48) 
Manual Worker Indicator
1    0.11 (0.31)    0.10 (0.30)   
Income    30258 (21633)    26747 (18561) 
Ownership Indicator    0.65 (0.48)    0.61 (0.49) 
House Indicator    0.55 (0.50)    0.50 (0.50) 
Number of Rooms    4.88 (2.31)    4.40 (2.15) 
Garden Indicator    0.87 (0.34)    0.84 (0.36) 
Urban Indicator    0.45 (0.50)    0.50 (0.50) 
Suburban Indicator    0.32 (0.47)    0.28 (0.45) 
Less than 2 Years Tenure Indicator    0.21 (0.41)    0.29 (0.45) 
2 to 5 Years Tenure Indicator    0.25 (0.43)    0.26 (0.44) 
6 to 15 Years Tenure Indicator    0.27 (0.45)    0.26 (0.44) 
Attitudinal Characteristics (including Motives for Recycling)         
Waste Generation Concern Indicator    0.93 (0.25)    0.92 (0.27) 
Environmental Concern Index    3.03 (0.66)    3.05 (0.68) 
Environmental Attitude Index    0.41 (0.68)    0.36 (0.68) 
Beneficial for the Environment Indicator    0.96 (0.19)    0.94 (0.23 ) 
Money Saving Indicator    0.47 (0.50)    0.51 (0.50) 
Civic Duty Indicator    0.88 (0.32)    0.87 (0.33) 
Responsible Citizen Indicator    0.52 (0.50)    0.55 (0.50) 
Mandatory Recycling Indicator    0.88 (0.32)    0.90 (0.30) 
Relevance of Mandatory Recycling
2    2.40 (0.96)    2.53 (0.93)   
* Unit pricing comprises weight- and volume-based programs. 
1 Means and standard deviations computed for subsample comprising respondents who reported to be employed (full 
or part time), in employment but not currently working, or retired. 
2 Means and standard deviations computed for subsample excluding respondents who reported mandatory recycling 
not be an applicable motive for recycling. 
  
 
Variable      Mean (SD)    Mean (SD) 
    All 
observations 
  Unit Pricing
* 
Pricing Methods         
Weight-based Fee Indicator    0.03 (0.16)    N/A 
Volume-based Fee Indicator    0.12 (0.33)    N/A 
Frequency-based Fee Indicator    0.04 (0.21)    N/A 
Fee based on Household Size Indicator    0.15 (0.36)    N/A 
Flat Fee Indicator    0.49 (0.50)    N/A 
No Fee Indicator    0.13 (0.33)    N/A 
Other Form of Charging Indicator    0.04 (0.20)    N/A 
Services Available         
More  than  Once  a  Week  Pick-up  of  Mixed  Waste 
Indicator 
  0.36 (0.48)    0.39 (0.49) 
Once a Week Pick-up of Mixed Waste Indicator    0.46 (0.50)    0.42 (0.49) 
Door-to-Door Service for Glass Indicator    0.27 (0.44)    0.32 (0.47)   
More than Once a Week Pick-up of Glass Indicator
1    0.17 (0.37)    0.34 (0.48)    
Once a Week Pick-up of Glass Indicator
1    0.44 (0.50)    0.43 (0.50) 
Door-to-Door Service for Plastic Indicator    0.33 (0.47)    0.36 (0.48) 
More than Once a Week Pick-up of Plastic Indicator
2    0.15 (0.36)    0.32 (0.47) 
Once a Week Pick-up of Plastic Indicator
2    0.46 (0.50)    0.46 (0.50) 
Door-to-Door Service for Aluminum Indicator    0.31 (0.46)    0.36 (0.48)   
More  than  Once  a  Week  Pick-up  of  Aluminum 
Indicator
3 
  0.16 (0.37)    0.31 (0.46)   
Once a Week Pick-up of Aluminum Indicator
3    0.45 (0.50)    0.45 (0.50)   
Door-to-Door Service for Paper Indicator    0.45 (0.50)    0.47 (0.50)   
More than Once a Week Pick-up of Paper Indicator
4    0.12 (0.33)    0.27 (0.45)    
Once a Week Pick-up of Paper Indicator
4    0.36 (0.48)    0.36 (0.48)   
Door-to-Door Service for Food Indicator    0.39 (0.49)    0.44 (0.50)    
More than Once a Week Pick-up of Food Indicator
5    0.25 (0.43)    0.41 (0.49)    
Once a Week Pick-up of Food Indicator
5    0.40 (0.49)    0.35 (0.48) 
Drop Off for Glass Indicator    0.58 (0.49)    0.48 (0.50)   
Drop Off for Plastic Indicator    0.40 (0.49)    0.35 (0.48)      
Drop Off for Aluminum Indicator    0.44 (0.50)    0.38 (0.48) 
Drop Off for Paper Indicator    0.45 (0.50)    0.40 (0.49) 
Drop Off for Food Indicator    0.31 (0.46)    0.28 (0.45) 
Bring Back with Refund for Glass Indicator    0.18 (0.39)    0.17 (0.38) 
Bring Back with Refund for Plastic Indicator    0.18 (0.38)    0.18 (0.39) 
Bring Back with Refund for Aluminum Indicator    0.08 (0.26)    0.08 (0.28) 
Bring Back with Refund for Paper Indicator    0.02 (0.15)    0.04 (0.20) 
Bring Back with Refund for Food Indicator    0.01 (0.11)    0.03 (0.17) 
Bring Back with No Refund for Glass Indicator    0.03 (0.18)    0.05 (0.21) 
Bring Back with No Refund for Plastic Indicator    0.03 (0.17)    0.05 (0.21)   
Bring Back with No Refund for Aluminum Indicator    0.03 (0.16)    0.05 (0.21) 
Bring Back with No Refund for Paper Indicator    0.02 (0.15)    0.05 (0.21) 
Bring Back with No Refund for Food Indicator    0.02 (0.12)    0.03 (0.18) 
* Unit pricing comprises weight- and volume-based programs. 
1 Summary statistics computed for respondents with access to curbside recycling of glass.  
2 Summary statistics computed for respondents with access to curbside recycling of plastic.
  
3 Summary statistics computed for respondents with access to curbside recycling of aluminum. 
4 Summary statistics computed for respondents with access to curbside recycling of paper. 
5 Summary statistics computed for respondents with access to curbside recycling of food.  
 
Table 3a. Recycling: univariate (binary) and multivariate probit estimation results 
 Variable 
Glass    Plastic    Aluminum    Paper    Food 
Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi
    Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi 
AUSTRALIA  0.19 
(0.15) 
0.16 




















CANADA  -0.05 
(0.14) 
-0.13 





(0.16)    0.11 
(0.11) 
0.18 
(0.11)    -0.19 
(0.12) 
-0.13 































































































(0.13)    0.13 
(0.15) 
0.10 













































(0.09)    0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.03 










































































AGE_CLASS_1  0.03 
(0.10) 
0.00 



















































(0.08)    -0.00 
(0.07) 
-0.00 
(0.07)    -0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.08 












(0.07)    0.04 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.07)    -0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.09 








(0.03)    -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03)    0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02)    0.00 
(0.03) 
0.01 














(0.05)    0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.01 













(0.03)    -0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03)    0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03)    -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 








(0.11)    -0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.10)    -0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.01 














(0.10)    -0.00 
(0.08) 
-0.01 




(0.08)    -0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.13 









(0.09)    -0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.08)    -0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.05 
(0.08)    0.00 
(0.09) 
-0.09 








(0.09)    -0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.08)    -0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.08)    0.08 
(0.09) 
0.02 




EMPL_FULLTIME  0.04 
(0.11) 
0.03 








(0.10)    0.12 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.11)    0.08 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.09)  Variable 
Glass    Plastic    Aluminum    Paper    Food 
Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi
    Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi 
EMPL_PARTTIME  -0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.12)    0.13 
(0.11) 
0.12 





(0.10)    0.07 
(0.12) 
0.12 




EMPL_RETIRED  -0.00 
(0.13) 
0.01 









(0.11)    -0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.04 






EMPL_HOMEMAKER  -0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.02 
(0.12)    0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.04 













EMPL_STUDENT  -0.18 
(0.12) 
-0.14 
(0.13)    -0.07 
(0.13) 
0.02 




(0.12)    0.05 
(0.13) 
0.12 




EMPL_LEAVE  -0.03 
(0.18) 
-0.11 
(0.19)    -0.10 
(0.17) 
-0.04 
(0.18)    -0.02 
(0.17) 
0.06 
(0.18)    -0.05 
(0.18) 
-0.07 









(0.10)    -0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.11)    0.00 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.09)    -0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.07 

















(0.09)    -0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.07 




OCCUP_3  0.04 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.12)    -0.08 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.13)    -0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.11 
(0.11)    0.02 
(0.12) 
0.00 

















(0.08)    0.08 
(0.09) 
0.05 






OCCUP_5  -0.00 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.11)    -0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.11)    -0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.10)    0.05 
(0.11) 
0.08 









(0.00)    0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00)    0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00)    0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 








(0.06)    -0.03 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.06)    0.04 
(0.05) 
0.08 

















(0.06)    0.06 
(0.06) 
0.06 
















(0.01)    0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01)    0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 




















(0.08)    0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.07)    0.03 
(0.08) 
0.00 









(0.07)    0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.07)    -0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06)    0.08 
(0.07) 
0.06 










(0.07)    0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.07)    -0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.06)    0.03 
(0.07) 
0.05 




















(0.07)    -0.12 
(0.08) 
-0.10 










(0.07)    -0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.11 




(0.06)    -0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.09 


































(0.02)    -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 



















(0.10)    -0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.05 




(0.10)    0.15 
(0.10) 
0.13 



















(0.04)    0.01 
(0.05) 
0.05 





















(0.03)    0.04 
(0.04) 
0.03 




(0.03)  Variable 
Glass    Plastic    Aluminum    Paper    Food 
Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi
    Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi 
WSTCHRG_WEIGHT  0.02 
(0.44) 
-0.02 
(0.46)    -0.10 
(0.44) 
0.10 
(0.45)    0.55 
(0.42) 
0.37 
(0.42)    0.33 
(0.46) 
0.18 






WSTCHRG_VOL  0.47 
(0.44) 
0.50 
(0.46)    0.29 
(0.42) 
0.55 
(0.43)    0.52 
(0.41) 
0.40 










WSTCHRG_FREQ  0.09 
(0.44) 
0.09 
(0.46)    0.05 
(0.43) 
0.34 
(0.44)    0.26 
(0.42) 
0.11 
(0.42)    0.44 
(0.45) 
0.41 

















(0.07)    -0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.12 


























































RCYCLFREQ_X_1  -0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.13 



















RCYCLFREQ_X_2  -0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.05 
(0.14)    -0.16 
(0.12) 
-0.06 































































































































(0.04)    0.05 
(0.04) 
0.03 













(0.03)    0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03)    -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 

















(0.10)    0.11 
(0.09) 
0.03 













(0.03)    0.01 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03)    -0.00 
(0.02) 
0.02 


















(0.00)    -0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 









UF_RESOWNR  0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.11 
(0.14)    -0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.10 























(0.13)    -0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.17 
(0.13)    0.05 
(0.13) 
0.07 










(0.03)    -0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.03)    0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 










UF_GARDEN  -0.19 
(0.19) 
-0.13 
(0.20)    -0.11 
(0.19) 
0.02 




(0.18)    0.05 
(0.18) 
0.13 













(0.13)    -0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.12)    -0.06 
(0.14) 
-0.09 




UF_SERVICE_X  -0.12 
(0.17) 
-0.07 








(0.13)    0.09 
(0.17) 
0.08 



















(0.21)    -0.33 
(0.24) 
-0.39 
(0.24)    -0.15 
(0.18) 
-0.21 
(0.19)  Variable 
Glass    Plastic    Aluminum    Paper    Food 
Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi
    Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi    Binary  Multi 




(0.09)    0.05 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.08)    0.06 
(0.08) 
0.03 












(0.07)    -0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.06)    0.02 
(0.06) 
0.06 




































                             
21 ˆ       0.56
*** 
(0.02)
      0.56
*** 
(0.02)
      0.56
*** 
(0.02)
      0.56
*** 
(0.02)




31 ˆ      0.45
*** 
(0.02)      0.45
*** 
(0.02)      0.45
*** 
(0.02)      0.45
*** 
(0.02)      0.45
*** 
(0.02) 
41 ˆ      0.37
*** 
(0.03)      0.37
*** 
(0.03)      0.37
*** 
(0.03)      0.37
*** 
(0.03)      0.37
*** 
(0.03) 
51 ˆ      0.15
*** 
(0.02)      0.15
*** 
(0.02)      0.15
*** 
(0.02)      0.15
*** 
(0.02)      0.15
*** 
(0.02) 
32 ˆ      0.52
*** 
(0.02)      0.52
*** 
(0.02)      0.52
*** 
(0.02)      0.52
*** 
(0.02)      0.52
*** 
(0.02) 
42 ˆ      0.42
*** 
(0.03)      0.42
*** 
(0.03)      0.42
*** 
(0.03)      0.42
*** 
(0.03)      0.42
*** 
(0.03) 
52 ˆ      0.17
*** 
(0.02)      0.17
*** 
(0.02)      0.17
*** 
(0.02)      0.17
*** 
(0.02)      0.17
*** 
(0.02) 
43 ˆ      0.38
*** 
(0.03)      0.38
*** 
(0.03)      0.38
*** 
(0.03)      0.38
*** 
(0.03)      0.38
*** 
(0.03) 
53 ˆ      0.21
*** 
(0.02)      0.21
*** 
(0.02)      0.21
*** 
(0.02)      0.21
*** 
(0.02)      0.21
*** 
(0.02) 
54 ˆ      0.23
*** 
(0.02)      0.23
*** 
(0.02)      0.23
*** 
(0.02)      0.23
*** 
(0.02)      0.23
*** 
(0.02) 
                             
Number of Observations  6918  6250    6887  6250    6699  6250    6894  6250    6569  6250 
Log Likelihood  -2025  -11000    -2261  -11000    -2901  -11000    -1927  -11000    -3693  -11000 
Wald 




*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) figures in brackets are robust standard errors.  
 
Table 3b. Recycling: marginal effects from the binary probit estimation 
Variable  Glass    Plastic    Aluminum    Paper    Food 
AUSTRALIA  0.02    0.04
**    0.06
*    0.03
***    -0.17
*** 
CANADA  -0.01    0.04
**    0.04    -0.03    -0.13
*** 
CZECHREP  -0.15
***    -0.01    -0.47
***    -0.03    -0.15
*** 
FRANCE  -0.13
***    -0.08
***    -0.13
***    -0.05
**    -0.11
*** 
ITALY  -0.07
***    -0.05
*    -0.07
**    -0.06
***    0.05 
KOREA  0.03
*    0.05
***    0.19
***    0.02    0.40
*** 
MEXICO  -0.27
***    -0.12
***    -0.09
**    -0.17
***    0.01 
NETHERLANDS  -0.03
*    -0.35
***    -0.44
***    0.00    0.04 
NORWAY   -0.11
***    -0.17
***    -0.18
***    0.03
***    0.11
*** 
STATUS_MARRIED  0.01
**    0.03
***    0.03
*    0.01
*    0.00 
GENDER_MALE  0.00    -0.01
*    0.04
***    -0.01
*    -0.01 
AGE_CLASS_1  0.00    0.05
***    -0.10
***    -0.02    -0.03 
AGE_CLASS_2  -0.01    0.05
***    -0.05
**    -0.02
*    -0.02 
AGE_CLASS_3  0.02    0.04
***    -0.00    -0.01    -0.02 
AGE_CLASS_4  -0.01    0.02
*    0.01    -0.02    0.00 
ADULTS  -0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
UNDER5  -0.01
**    -0.02
**    0.01    -0.01
*    0.00 
BETWEEN5AND18  -0.01    -0.00    0.01    -0.00    0.00 
EDUC_CLASS_1  -0.03
*    -0.00    -0.03    -0.03
*    0.05 
EDUC_CLASS_2  -0.03
**    -0.00    -0.04
*    -0.01    0.00 
EDUC_CLASS_3  -0.04
***    -0.00    -0.02    -0.00    0.03 
EDUC_CLASS_4  -0.02    -0.01    -0.01    0.01    0.01 
EMPL_FULLTIME  0.01    0.03
*    0.05    0.02    0.03 
EMPL_PARTTIME  -0.01    0.02    0.06
**    0.01    0.04 
EMPL_RETIRED  -0.00    0.03
*    0.06
**    0.00    0.07
** 
EMPL_HOMEMAKER  -0.01    0.01    0.06
**    0.02
**    0.03 
EMPL_STUDENT  -0.03    -0.01    0.05    0.01    -0.00 
EMPL_LEAVE  -0.00    -0.02    -0.01    -0.01    -0.10
* 
OCCUP_1  -0.01    -0.02    0.00    -0.01    -0.03 
OCCUP_2  -0.01    -0.03    -0.06
**    -0.01    -0.05
* 
OCCUP_3  0.01    -0.01    -0.02    0.00    0.01 
OCCUP_4  0.00    -0.03
*    -0.04    0.01    -0.05
** 
OCCUP_5  -0.00    -0.03    -0.01    0.01    -0.03 
INCOME_CONT  0.00
**    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
RESOWNR  0.01    -0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01 
RESTYPE_HOUSE  -0.02
*    -0.02
*    0.02    -0.02
***    0.09
*** 
RESDROOMS  0.01
***    0.00    0.00    0.00
***    0.01
* 
GARDEN  0.02    0.04
**    0.01    0.00    0.04
* 
AREADESC_URBAN  -0.00    0.00    0.00    0.01    -0.07
*** 
AREADESC_SUBURBAN  -0.01    0.00    -0.01    0.00    -0.06
*** 
RESDYRS_CLASS_1  -0.02    -0.04
***    -0.05
**    -0.02    -0.05
** 
RESDYRS_CLASS_2  -0.02    -0.01    -0.04
*    -0.01    -0.05
** 
RESDYRS_CLASS_3  -0.02
*    -0.03
***    -0.04
**    -0.02
*    -0.01 
ENVRANK  -0.00    -0.00    -0.01
***    -0.01
***    -0.01 
WSTE_CNCRN  0.01    -0.01    -0.05
*    0.02    0.02 
ENVCNCRN_INDX  0.02
***    0.02
***    0.05
***    0.00    0.02
* 
ENVATTIT_INDX  0.01
***    0.01
**    0.04
***    0.01    -0.02 Variable  Glass    Plastic    Aluminum    Paper    Food 
WSTCHRG_WEIGHT  0.00    -0.02    0.15
*    0.04    0.24
** 
WSTCHRG_VOL  0.05    0.04    0.15    0.07
***    0.21
* 
WSTCHRG_FREQ  0.01    0.01    0.08    0.04    0.18 
COLLFREQ_CLASS_1  -0.02    -0.03
*    -0.06
***    -0.01    -0.12
*** 
COLLFREQ_CLASS_2  -0.03
***    -0.03
***    -0.06
***    -0.02
**    -0.12
*** 
RCYCLCOLDTD_X  0.11
***    0.21
***    0.43
***    0.16
***    0.37
*** 
RCYCLFREQ_X_1  -0.02    -0.13
***    -0.19
***    -0.05
**    -0.00 
RCYCLFREQ_X_2  -0.00    -0.03    -0.09
**    -0.03    -0.03 
RCYCLCOLDOF_X  0.11
***    0.15
***    0.34
***    0.11
***    0.26
*** 
RCYCLCOLRFD_X  0.05
***    0.12
***    0.22
***    0.05
***    0.16
*** 
RCYCLCOLBBK_X  0.03
***    0.07
***    0.15
***    0.03
**    0.26
*** 
MTVRCYLENVR_LRKT  0.04
***    0.03
***    0.06
***    0.04
***    0.04
*** 
MTVRCYLDUTY_LRKT  0.02
***    0.02
***    0.02    0.02
***    0.02 
MTVRCYLRESP_LRKT  -0.00    0.01    0.00    0.00    -0.01 
MTVRCYLMAND  0.06
***    0.04
*    0.04    0.05
***    0.00 
MTVRCYLMAND_LRKT  -0.01    0.00    -0.00    -0.00    0.03
*** 
UF_INCOME  0.00    0.00    -0.00    0.00    0.00
* 
UF_RESOWNR  0.00    -0.01    -0.06    -0.05
**    0.05 
UF_HOUSE  0.04
***    0.03
*    -0.04    0.01    -0.16
*** 
UF_RESDROOMS  -0.01    -0.00    0.01    0.00    -0.02
* 
UF_GARDEN  -0.03    -0.02    0.06    0.01    -0.04 
UF_URSUB  0.04
***    0.04
**    -0.01    -0.01    0.05 
UF_SERVICE_X  -0.02    -0.04    -0.10
**    0.01    -0.10
** 
UF_MANDATED  -0.08
*    -0.03    -0.10    -0.05    -0.06 
UF_MTVRCYLDUTY_LRKT  0.01    0.01    0.02    0.00    -0.02 
UF_MTVRCYLRESP_LRKT  -0.01    -0.01    0.01    -0.00    0.04
** 
                   




*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Table 4. Recycling: ordered probit estimation results 
Variable  Glass    Plastic    Aluminum    Paper    Food 
AUSTRALIA  -0.24 (0.09)
***    -0.21 (0.08)
***    0.08 (0.08)    -0.21 (0.08)
***    -0.49 (0.09)
*** 
CANADA  -0.29 (0.08)
***    -0.23 (0.08)
***    0.02 (0.08)    -0.24 (0.08)
***    -0.41 (0.09)
*** 
CZECHREP  -1.20 (0.08)
***    -0.74 (0.08)
***    -1.46 (0.10)
***    -0.78 (0.08)
***    -0.50 (0.10)
*** 
FRANCE  -0.44 (0.08)
***    -0.18 (0.08)
**    -0.28 (0.08)
***    -0.26 (0.08)
***    -0.28 (0.08)
*** 
ITALY  -0.41 (0.08)
***    -0.30 (0.08)
***    -0.18 (0.08)
**    -0.29 (0.07)
***    0.17 (0.08)
** 
KOREA  -0.65 (0.09)
***    -0.55 (0.09)
***    0.02 (0.09)    -0.57 (0.09)
***    0.54 (0.09)
*** 
MEXICO  -1.46 (0.09)
***    -1.04 (0.09)
***    -0.47 (0.09)
***    -1.11 (0.09)
***    -0.18 (0.10)
* 
NETHERLANDS  -0.24 (0.07)
***    -1.24 (0.08)
***    -1.22 (0.08)
***    0.07 (0.07)    0.08 (0.07) 
NORWAY   -0.48 (0.08)
***    -0.78 (0.08)
***    -0.44 (0.08)
***    -0.03 (0.08)    0.19 (0.08)
** 
STATUS_MARRIED  0.05 (0.03)    0.07 (0.03)
**    0.05 (0.04)    0.03 (0.03)    0.02 (0.04) 
GENDER_MALE  0.02 (0.03)    -0.01 (0.03)    0.10 (0.03)
***    -0.02 (0.03)    0.00 (0.03) 
AGE_CLASS_1  -0.07 (0.07)    0.12 (0.07)
*    -0.31 (0.07)
***    -0.23 (0.07)
***    -0.18 (0.07)
** 
AGE_CLASS_2  -0.04 (0.05)    0.16 (0.05)
***    -0.16 (0.06)
***    -0.16 (0.05)
***    -0.12 (0.06)
** 
AGE_CLASS_3  0.05 (0.05)    0.17 (0.05)
***    0.01 (0.06)    -0.08 (0.05)    -0.07 (0.06) 
AGE_CLASS_4  -0.03 (0.05)    0.08 (0.05)
*    0.04 (0.05)    -0.03 (0.05)    -0.06 (0.05) 
ADULTS  -0.00 (0.02)    0.00 (0.02)    -0.01 (0.02)    -0.01 (0.02)    -0.00 (0.02) 
UNDER5  -0.08 (0.03)
***    -0.06 (0.03)
*    -0.01 (0.03)    -0.05 (0.03)    -0.02 (0.03) 
BETWEEN5AND18  -0.04 (0.02)
**    -0.01 (0.02)    -0.02 (0.02)    0.00 (0.02)    0.00 (0.02) 
EDUC_CLASS_1  -0.30 (0.07)
***    -0.11 (0.07)
*    -0.16 (0.07)
**    -0.16 (0.07)
**    0.08 (0.08) 
EDUC_CLASS_2  -0.18 (0.06)
***    -0.03 (0.06)    -0.11 (0.06)
*    -0.04 (0.06)    0.00 (0.06) 
EDUC_CLASS_3  -0.19 (0.06)
***    -0.03 (0.06)    -0.09 (0.06)    -0.05 (0.05)    0.08 (0.06) 
EDUC_CLASS_4  -0.08 (0.06)    -0.05 (0.05)    0.00 (0.06)    0.03 (0.05)    0.04 (0.06) 
EMPL_FULLTIME  0.05 (0.07)    0.09 (0.07)    0.14 (0.07)
*    0.04 (0.07)    -0.01 (0.08) 
EMPL_PARTTIME  0.05 (0.08)    0.05 (0.08)    0.18 (0.08)
**    0.08 (0.08)    0.03 (0.08) 
EMPL_RETIRED  0.03 (0.08)    0.09 (0.08)    0.22 (0.09)
***    0.05 (0.08)    0.08 (0.09) 
EMPL_HOMEMAKER  -0.02 (0.07)    -0.04 (0.07)    0.16 (0.08)
**    0.07 (0.07)    0.04 (0.08) 
EMPL_STUDENT  -0.03 (0.08)    -0.03 (0.08)    0.17 (0.09)
**    -0.08 (0.08)    -0.02 (0.09) 
EMPL_LEAVE  -0.06 (0.12)    -0.11 (0.12)    0.01 (0.13)    -0.06 (0.13)    -0.24 (0.15) 
OCCUP_1  -0.08 (0.07)    -0.06 (0.07)    -0.02 (0.07)    -0.08 (0.06)    -0.03 (0.07) 
OCCUP_2  -0.07 (0.07)    -0.08 (0.07)    -0.14 (0.07)
**    -0.08 (0.06)    -0.11 (0.07)
* 
OCCUP_3  0.04 (0.08)    -0.02 (0.08)    -0.02 (0.08)    0.09 (0.08)    0.04 (0.08) 
OCCUP_4  -0.08 (0.06)    -0.10 (0.06)
*    -0.12 (0.06)
**    -0.03 (0.05)    -0.10 (0.06)
* 
OCCUP_5  0.00 (0.07)    -0.07 (0.07)    0.02 (0.07)    -0.04 (0.07)    -0.01 (0.07) 
INCOME_CONT  0.00 (0.00)
***    0.00 (0.00)
**    0.00 (0.00)
*    0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00) 
RESOWNR  0.14 (0.04)
***    0.08 (0.04)
**    0.09 (0.04)
**    0.08 (0.04)
**    0.06 (0.04) 
RESTYPE_HOUSE  -0.00 (0.04)    0.01 (0.04)    0.07 (0.05)    -0.01 (0.04)    0.23 (0.05)
*** 
RESDROOMS  0.03 (0.01)
***    0.01 (0.01)    0.00 (0.01)    0.02 (0.01)
*    0.02 (0.01)
** 
GARDEN  0.04 (0.05)    0.05 (0.05)    -0.04 (0.06)    -0.04 (0.05)    0.12 (0.06)
* 
AREADESC_URBAN  0.04 (0.05)    -0.01 (0.05)    -0.01 (0.05)    0.04 (0.04)    -0.20 (0.05)
*** 
AREADESC_SUBURBAN  0.02 (0.05)    -0.01 (0.04)    -0.02 (0.05)    0.00 (0.04)    -0.16 (0.05)
*** 
RESDYRS_CLASS_1  -0.13 (0.05)
***    -0.12 (0.05)
**    -0.12 (0.05)
**    -0.09 (0.05)
*    -0.12 (0.05)
** 
RESDYRS_CLASS_2  -0.11 (0.04)
***    -0.10 (0.04)
**    -0.11 (0.05)
**    -0.06 (0.04)    -0.15 (0.05)
*** 
RESDYRS_CLASS_3  -0.13 (0.04)
***    -0.12 (0.04)
***    -0.08 (0.04)
*    -0.07 (0.04)
*    -0.06 (0.04) 
ENVRANK  -0.03 (0.01)
***    -0.01 (0.01)    -0.03 (0.01)
***    -0.04 (0.01)
***    -0.02 (0.01) Variable  Glass    Plastic    Aluminum    Paper    Food 
WSTE_CNCRN  0.18 (0.07)
***    -0.03 (0.07)    -0.12 (0.08)
*    0.10 (0.07)    0.05 (0.08) 
ENVCNCRN_INDX  0.02 (0.03)    0.07 (0.03)
**    0.10 (0.03)
***    0.03 (0.03)    0.06 (0.03)
** 
ENVATTIT_INDX  0.12 (0.02)
***    0.06 (0.02)
***    0.11 (0.02)
***    0.03 (0.02)    -0.02 (0.02) 
WSTCHRG_WEIGHT  0.27 (0.28)    0.11 (0.28)    0.47 (0.30)    0.30 (0.31)    0.77 (0.30)
*** 
WSTCHRG_VOL  0.49 (0.28)
*    0.34 (0.27)    0.52 (0.30)
*    0.56 (0.30)
**    0.71 (0.30)
** 
WSTCHRG_FREQ  0.33 (0.29)    0.23 (0.27)    0.45 (0.31)    0.33 (0.31)    0.70 (0.30)
** 
COLLFREQ_CLASS_1  -0.09 (0.05)
*    -0.12 (0.05)
**    -0.15 (0.05)
***    -0.09 (0.05)
*    -0.31 (0.05)
*** 
COLLFREQ_CLASS_2  -0.09 (0.04)
**    -0.12 (0.04)
***    -0.14 (0.04)
***    -0.08 (0.04)
**    -0.29 (0.05)
*** 
RCYCLCOLDTD_X  0.71 (0.07)
***    0.91 (0.06)
***    1.30 (0.07)
***    0.76 (0.06)
***    0.90 (0.06)
*** 
RCYCLFREQ_X_1  -0.32 (0.08)
***    -0.39 (0.08)
***    -0.44 (0.08)
***    -0.13 (0.08)
*    0.02 (0.07) 
RCYCLFREQ_X_2  -0.15 (0.07)
**    -0.18 (0.06)
***    -0.21 (0.06)
***    -0.08 (0.05)    -0.03 (0.06) 
RCYCLCOLDOF_X  0.43 (0.05)
***    0.52 (0.05)
***    0.82 (0.05)
***    0.48 (0.05)
***    0.60 (0.05)
*** 
RCYCLCOLRFD_X  0.23 (0.04)
***    0.75 (0.05)
***    0.67 (0.07)
***    0.23 (0.10)
**    0.38 (0.12)
*** 
RCYCLCOLBBK_X  0.10 (0.09)    0.23 (0.09)
**    0.47 (0.11)
***    0.18 (0.10)
*    0.61 (0.11)
*** 
MTVRCYLENVR_LRKT  0.29 (0.03)
***    0.24 (0.03)
***    0.21 (0.03)
***    0.27 (0.03)
***    0.15 (0.03)
*** 
MTVRCYLDUTY_LRKT  0.13 (0.03)
***    0.11 (0.03)
***    0.09 (0.03)
***    0.16 (0.03)
***    0.07 (0.03)
** 
MTVRCYLRESP_LRKT  -0.03 (0.02)    0.01 (0.02)    -0.03 (0.02)    -0.01 (0.02)    -0.03 (0.02)
* 
MTVRCYLMAND  0.28 (0.07)
***    0.18 (0.07)
***    0.09 (0.07)    0.19  (0.07)
***    0.01 (0.08) 
MTVRCYLMAND_LRKT  -0.06 (0.02)
***    -0.03 (0.02)    0.01 (0.02)    -0.02 (0.02)    0.08 (0.02)
*** 
UF_INCOME  0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)    -0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00)    0.00 (0.00) 
UF_RESOWNR  -0.16 (0.08)
**    -0.11 (0.08)    -0.23 (0.08)    -0.19 (0.08)
***    -0.00 (0.08) 
UF_HOUSE  0.01 (0.08)    -0.06 (0.08)    -0.13 (0.08)    -0.04 (0.08)    -0.36 (0.08)
*** 
UF_RESDROOMS  0.00 (0.02)    0.01 (0.02)    0.05 (0.02)    0.00 (0.02)    -0.02 (0.02) 
UF_GARDEN  -0.09 (0.11)    -0.01 (0.11)    0.06 (0.12)    -0.02 (0.11)    -0.18 (0.12) 
UF_URSUB  0.02 (0.08)    0.01 (0.09)    -0.08 (0.09)    -0.03 (0.08)    0.08 (0.09) 
UF_SERVICE_X  0.06 (0.12)    0.08 (0.10)    -0.20 (0.11)    0.12 (0.13)    -0.29 (0.10)
*** 
UF_MANDATED  -0.42 (0.15)
***    -0.16 (0.14)    -0.33 (0.15)    -0.31 0.16)
**    -0.12 (0.16) 
UF_MTVRCYLDUTY_LRKT  0.01 (0.05)    0.01 (0.05)    0.08 (0.06)    0.01 (0.05)    -0.06 (0.06) 
UF_MTVRCYLRESP_LRKT  0.00 (0.04)    -0.05 (0.04)    -0.03 (0.04)    -0.03 (0.04)    0.08 (0.04)
** 
                   
Number of Observations  6681    6722    6498    6732    6338 
Log Likelihood  -8293.4    -8622.4    -7758.2    -8567.7    -7292.1 




*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) figures in brackets are robust standard errors. 
 
 
 Table 5. Waste prevention: probit and ordered probit estimation results 
Variable 
Binary Probit   
Ordered Probit  Coefficient  Marginal Effect   
AUSTRALIA  -1.57 (0.10)
***  -0.48 (0.02)
***    0.31 (0.07)
*** 
CANADA  -0.65 (0.09)
***  -0.25 (0.03)
***    0.19 (0.07)
*** 
CZECHREP        0.06 (0.08) 
FRANCE  -1.30 (0.10)
***  -0.43 (0.02)
***    0.12 (0.07)
* 
ITALY  -1.42 (0.09)
***  -0.47 (0.02)
***    0.04 (0.06) 
KOREA  -2.08 (0.11)
***  -0.55 (0.01)
***    0.12 (0.07)
* 
MEXICO  -0.21 (0.12)
*  -0.08 (0.05)
*    0.27 (0.08)
*** 
NETHERLANDS  -1.26 (0.10)
***  -0.42 (0.02)
***    0.01 (0.07) 
NORWAY   -1.01 (0.10)
***  -0.36 (0.03)
***    0.41 (0.07)
*** 
STATUS_MARRIED  -0.02 (0.04)  -0.01 (0.02)    0.03 (0.03) 
GENDER_MALE  0.12 (0.04)
***  0.05 (0.02)
***    -0.05 (0.03)
* 
AGE_CLASS_1  0.38 (0.08)
***  0.15 (0.03)
***    0.11 (0.06)
* 
AGE_CLASS_2  0.29 (0.06)
***  0.12 (0.02)
***    0.09 (0.05)
* 
AGE_CLASS_3  0.19 (0.06)
***  0.08 (0.02)
***    0.01 (0.05) 
AGE_CLASS_4  0.10 (0.06)
*  0.04 (0.02)
*    0.04 (0.04) 
ADULTS  0.02 (0.02)  0.01 (0.01)    0.01 (0.02) 
UNDER5  0.02 (0.04)  0.01 (0.02)    -0.01 (0.03) 
BETWEEN5AND18  0.01 (0.02)  0.00 (0.01)    0.01 (0.02) 
EDUC_CLASS_1  -0.14 (0.08)
*  -0.06 (0.03)
*    -0.06 (0.06) 
EDUC_CLASS_2  -0.15 (0.07)
**  -0.06 (0.03)
**    -0.03 (0.05) 
EDUC_CLASS_3  -0.03 (0.07)  -0.01 (0.03)    -0.03 (0.05) 
EDUC_CLASS_4  -0.02 (0.07)  -0.01 (0.03)    -0.05 (0.05) 
EMPL_FULLTIME  -0.21 (0.07)
***  -0.08 (0.03)
***    0.00 (0.05) 
EMPL_PARTTIME  -0.17 (0.08)
**  -0.07 (0.03)
**    -0.00 (0.06) 
EMPL_RETIRED  -0.13 (0.08)  -0.05 (0.03)    0.01 (0.06) 
EMPL_HOMEMAKER  -0.22 (0.09)
**  -0.09 (0.04)
**    0.09 (0.07) 
EMPL_STUDENT  -0.16 (0.11)  -0.06 (0.04)    -0.03 (0.08) 
EMPL_LEAVE  -0.02 (0.15)  -0.01 (0.06)    0.04 (0.11) 
INCOME_CONT  -0.00 (0.00)
*  -0.00 (0.00)
*    0.00 (0.00) 
RESTYPE_HOUSE  -0.04 (0.04)  -0.02 (0.02)    -0.03 (0.03) 
GARDEN  0.11 (0.06)
*  0.04 (0.02)
*    0.11 (0.04)
*** 
AREADESC_URBAN  -0.02 (0.05)  -0.01 (0.02)    -0.09 (0.04)
** 
AREADESC_SUBURBAN  -0.01 (0.05)  0.00 (0.02)    -0.13 (0.04)
*** 
ENVRANK  -0.05 (0.01)
***  -0.02 (0.00)
***    -0.01 (0.01) 
WSTE_CNCRN  0.08 (0.09)  0.03 (0.04)    -0.06 (0.06) 
ENVCNCRN_INDX  0.14 (0.04)
***  0.06 (0.01)
***    0.26 (0.03)
*** 
ENVATTIT_INDX  0.12 (0.03)
***  0.05 (0.01)
***    -0.01 (0.02) 
USERFEE  0.05 (0.06)  0.02 (0.02)    0.11 (0.04)
*** 
COLLFREQ_CLASS_1  -0.13 (0.06)
**  -0.05 (0.03)
**     
COLLFREQ_CLASS_2  -0.06 (0.05)  -0.03 (0.02)     
RCYCLCOLDTD_GLAS  -0.02 (0.11)  -0.01 (0.05)    -0.05 (0.06) 
RCYCLFREQ_GLAS_1  -0.31 (0.18)
*  -0.12 (0.07)
*     
RCYCLFREQ_GLAS_2  -0.06 (0.12)  -0.03 (0.05)     
RCYCLCOLDOF_GLAS  -0.11 (0.07)  -0.04 (0.03)    -0.04 (0.05) 
RCYCLCOLRFD_GLAS  0.00 (0.06)  0.00 (0.02)    0.05 (0.04) 
RCYCLCOLBBK_GLAS  -0.30 (0.13)
**  -0.12 (0.05)
**    -0.06 (0.09) Variable 
Binary Probit   
Ordered Probit  Coefficient  Marginal Effect   
RCYCLCOLDTD_PLST  0.04 (0.10)  0.02 (0.04)    0.10 (0.06) 
RCYCLFREQ_PLST_1  -0.33 (0.22)  -0.13 (0.08)     
RCYCLFREQ_PLST_2  -0.06 (0.13)  -0.02 (0.05)     
RCYCLCOLDOF_PLST  0.02 (0.07)  0.01 (0.03)    0.02 (0.05) 
RCYCLCOLRFD_PLST  0.04 (0.07)  0.02 (0.03)    0.03 (0.05) 
RCYCLCOLBBK_PLST  0.08 (0.14)  0.03 (0.06)    0.07 (0.10) 
RCYCLCOLDTD_MTAL  0.18 (0.11)
*  0.07 (0.04)
*    0.09 (0.06) 
RCYCLFREQ_MTAL_1  0.37 (0.22)
*  0.15 (0.08)
*     
RCYCLFREQ_MTAL_2  -0.14 (0.13)  -0.06 (0.05)     
RCYCLCOLDOF_MTAL  0.16 (0.06)
***  0.06 (0.02)
***    0.08 (0.04)
** 
RCYCLCOLRFD_MTAL  0.07 (0.09)  0.03 (0.03)    0.11 (0.06)
** 
RCYCLCOLBBK_MTAL  0.13 (0.15)  0.05 (0.06)    0.10 (0.10) 
RCYCLCOLDTD_PAPR  -0.04 (0.09)  -0.02 (0.04)     
RCYCLFREQ_PAPR _1  0.06 (0.17)  0.03 (0.07)     
RCYCLFREQ_PAPR _2  0.10 (0.09)  0.04 (0.04)     
RCYCLCOLDOF_PAPR  -0.02 (0.08)  -0.01 (0.03)     
RCYCLCOLRFD_PAPR  -0.08 (0.14)  -0.03 (0.06)     
RCYCLCOLBBK_PAPR  0.03 (0.16)  0.01 (0.06)     
MTVRCYLENVR_LRKT  0.20 (0.04)
***  0.08 (0.02)
***    0.19 (0.03)
*** 
MTVRCYLDUTY_LRKT  0.09 (0.03)
***  0.03 (0.01)
***    0.11 (0.02)
*** 
MTVRCYLRESP_LRKT  0.01 (0.02)  0.01 (0.01)    0.05 (0.02)
*** 
MTVRCYLMAND  0.22 (0.08)
***  0.09 (0.03)
***    0.09 (0.06) 
MTVRCYLMAND_LRKT  -0.07 (0.02)
***  -0.03 (0.01)
***    0.00 (0.02) 
Intercept  -0.42 (0.23)
*       
         
Number of Observations  6225      7027 
Log Likelihood  -3460.4      -7866.2 
Wald 
2   Statistic  1396.8      616.9 




*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) figures in brackets are robust standard errors. 